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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ARTHUR DENNIS KUSY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
K-MART APPAREL FASHIONS CORP., 
a Delaware corporation, and 
JOHN DOE, an individual, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Defendants and Respondents. ) 
Case No. 18360 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff-appellant, Arthur Dennis Kusy (hereinafter referred to as plaintiff), 
brought this action against defendant-respondent (hereinafter ref erred to as de-
fendant), to recover damages suffered when the plaintiff fell through a pallet 
furnished to the plaintiff by the defendant during the unloading of trees at the 
defendant's store. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Plaintiff appeals to this Court from a special jury verdict finding of no 
negligence against the def end ant and the trial court's denial of plaint if f's motion 
for a new trial. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks a remand of the case to the Third Judicial District Court of 
Utah for a new trial because of reversible error made by the trial court in 
instructions to the jury and refusal to permit cross examination of defendant's 
witness on the basis of defendant's sworn answers to written interrogatories. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about May 21, 1976, the plaintiff arrived at the garden shop of the 
K-Mart store in Murray, Utah with a trailer load of shrubs and trees to be 
delivered to said store. (TR p. 17 .) The plaintiff requested assistance from the 
garden shop manager in the unloading process. (TR p. 19.) The garden shop 
manager, Mr. Hunt (TR p. 121), designated a K-Mart employee named Mr. Coupe 
to select pallets from a pile (TR pp. 19 and 21) on the store's premises and to 
deliver pallets one by one by forklift up to the open side door of the trailer so 
that plaintiff could load them with shrubs and trees. (TR pp. 19 and 132.) Mr. 
Coupe was then to take the loaded pallets to an area near the garden shop and 
place them on the ground for later unloading. (TR p. 80.) 
The pallets when raised by forklift to the trailer door were approximately 5 
feet off the ground. (TR pp. 5, 6 and 135.) It was industry practice to unload 
trailers in this manner when pallets and a forklift were provided by a consignee of 
material. (TR p. 19.) 
The trees in the trailer were in five-gallon cans and weighed approximately 
65 pounds each. (TR pp. 20 and 79.) The plaintiff loaded pallets raised to the 
doorway by Mr. Coupe by taking a tree in each hand and stepping on the pallet 
boards nearest to the open doorway of the trailer (TR p. 25), then placing the 
trees on the pallet in rows, two deep, starting on each pallet furthermost from the 
-2-
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trailer. (TR pp. 79-80.) In this manner plaintiff loaded the first two pallets with 
from 25 to 30 trees resulting in a weight on each pallet of approximately 1900 
pounds. (TR pp. 20 and 80.) Plaintiff encountered no problem with these two 
pallets. (TR pp. 22, 64 and 82.) 
Plaintiff had substantial experience with pallets but did not consider himself 
an expert. (TR pp. 59 and 66.) He had driven approximately a million and a half 
miles (TR p. 58) during which time he had seen and used some 250,000 pallets. 
(TR p. 59.) Pallets of the kind used herein were built to sustain weights of from 
3,000 to 4,000 pounds. (TR pp. 20-21.) 
The pallets at the defendant's store were received from various companies 
which delivered materials to the garden shop. (TR p. 123.) When the pallets were 
unloaded the empty pallets would be placed by store personnel in piles on the 
K-Mart lot. (TR p. 125.) Such pallets were used over and over again by K-Mart 
employees for the purpose of loading or unloading trucks, as in the case at hand. 
(TR pp. 146 and 147 .) 
These pallets were in the possession and control of defendant. (TR pp. 21 
and 146.) Some of the pallets, at least, were owned by defendant (TR p. 146) but 
all were left in defendant's possession and control and were used for several weeks 
(TR p. 145) at a time if not permanently. (TR p. 146.) 
When the empty third pallet (TR p. 22) was forklifted to the open doorway 
of the trailer by Mr. Coupe, the plaintiff noticed there was a cracked board close 
to the forklift (TR pp. 22, 83 and 95) and that another board in the same area had 
a slight bend to it. (TR p. 95.) The plaintiff asked Mr. Coupe to get another 
pallet and Mr. Coupe refused to do so. (TR pp. 23, 24 and 86.) 
The plaintiff had no fear for his own safety because the one cracked and one 
bent board were close to the forklift and he wouldn't have to step near those. (TR 
-3-
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pp. 23, 25.) The, boards except for the two ref erred to, appeared to be sound and 
without defect. (TR pp. 25 and 109.) Plaintiff assumed and believed the pallet 
was safe to step on with the trees. (TR pp. 102 and 103.) Plaintiff indicated that 
there were 15 to 20 empty pallets in a pile available to Mr. Coupe (TR p. 24) but 
that he didn't insist that another pallet be brought. (TR pp. 24 and 103.) He said 
that his fear was not for himself breaking through the pallet, but that when the 
particular pallet in question was put on the ground and the tines of the forklift 
were removed the plants that were on the two boards that were cracked or bent 
might break those boards dropping some of the trees or shrubs to the ground and 
damaging them. (TR pp. 23, 97 and 110.) 
Plaintiff stepped out on the third pallet three or four times with a tree in 
each hand. (TR p. 99.) He had to step on the pallet to place the first trees in a 
row along the boards nearest the forklift. (TR p. 24.) He felt nothing wrong with 
the pallet as he stepped on it and it appeared safe to him. (TR p. 25.) He heard 
no cracks or pops or other sounds relative to this particular pallet. (TR p. 108.) 
As the plaintiff stepped out on the pallet at the time of the accident, he had 
in his hands two trees in five-gallon cans. (TR p. 100.) He stepped approximately 
in the middle of the pallet whereupon the cross boards and the 2 x 4's to which 
the boards were nailed broke. (TR pp. 100 and 101.) This dropped and tipped him. 
He fell some five feet, head first, toward the ground. (TR pp. 26 and 101.) 
In trying to breal< his fall, plaintiff put out his arms. He landed on his right 
hand and arm suffering a broken wrist and other injuries. (TR p. 101.) 
Plaintiff briefly looked at the pallet after his fall. The row of plants nearest 
to the forklift had stayed on and only the section where he had stepped had broken 
through. (TR p. 26.) Plaintiff did not know why the pallet broke and he had no 
explanation for the same. He had not closely inspected the pallet either before or 
-4-
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after the accident and he believed the pallet was sound except for two boards 
close to the forklift. 
After he fell, the plaintiff went into the K-Mart store to telephone his 
employer. (TR p. 28.) Plaintiff asked Mr. Hunt to have him driven to a hospital 
and Mr. Hunt refused. (TR pp. 27-28.) Mr. Coupe volunteered to drive him to a 
hospital and Mr. Coupe agreed to do so if he would wait until Mr. Coupe was off 
work. (TR p. 28.) Mr. Hunt refused to allow Mr. Coupe to leave early. (TR p. 
144.) Plaintiff waited for approximately an hour and then Mr. Coupe drove him to 
the hospital. (TR p. 29.) 
Mr. Hunt, the sole witness at the trial for the defendant, was the manager of 
the garden shop at the Murray K-Mart. (TR p. 121.) He stated that said store 
had a pile of pallets. (TR pp. 125 and 127 .) The store owned some pallets and its 
employees used all of them to unload trailers as was done in this case. These 
pallets were left at the store in a pile for a considerable time, some permanently. 
He admitted some of the pallets were run over. (TR P. 129.) 
The pallets came into the possession or ownership of the K-Mart store in the 
delivery to it of bags of cement or other materials. (TR p. 124.) As to the 
cement, the bags weighed approximately 90 pounds and the pallets of the type 
concerned herein (TR p. 132) came loaded with 35 bags. This would put a weight 
on such pallets (TR p. 124) of approximately 3,150 pounds. Pallets were also 
received when companies delivered cinder blo-cks. There would be on such pallets 
some 240 blocks weighing 15 pounds each. (TR p. 125.) This put a weight safely 
on the pallets so used of approximately 3,600 pounds. 
Defendant conceded that it controlled the pallets; used them over and over 
again; kept them for up to several weeks and some were owned and held perma-
nently (TR pp. 146 and 14 7 .) 
-5-
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At no time, Mr. Hunt said, did the defendant inspect or repair or do anything 
to maintain the pallets. (TR pp. 147 and 148.) Defendant used the pallets without 
more and its employees simply delivered them to various truck drivers for the 
unloading of trailers as was done with plaintiff herein. Defendant knew drivers 
unloading products from trailers had to step onto pallets to do so. (TR p. 147 .) 
Mr. Hunt testified that the condition of pallets given to plaintiff was no concern 
to him. (TR p. 149.) 
Mr. Hunt said he didn't know whether the pallet had broken or whether Mr. 
Kusy had simply fallen off the pallet. (TR p. 142.) He admitted that the pallet 
could have broken. (TR pp. 156 and 157 .) Counsel for plaintiff attempted to use 
defendant's Answers to written interrogatories (Record p. 65) in cross-examination 
as to this issue (Answer #9), to show defendant had admitted under oath that 
plaintiff had been dropped to the ground when the pallet broke. When this 
attempt was made (TR p. 155.), the trial judge called counsel into chambers. 
After a discussion the judge ruled that in such cross-examination plaintiff's counsel 
could not read to the witness the question and answer in the written interrogatory. 
The plaintiff took due exception to this ruling in open court. (Supplemental 
Transcript.) 
During the course of the trial the plaintiff requested that its proposed Jury 
Instructions Numbers 9 and 10 be given to the jury on res ipsa loquitur. {Supple-
mental Record.) The court refused and the plaintiff took due exception to such 
refusal. (TR p. 158.) 
The defendant submitted to the court a proposed jury instruction on unavoid-
able accident. The court accepted this proposed instruction and gave it to the 
jury. (Record p. 175.) Plaintiff's counsel duly took exception to this instruction. 
(TR p. 159.) 
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The special verdict with respect to damages shows the jury found medical 
expenses of $1,088.13; lost earnings to the date of the trial of $7 ,500.00; lost 
future earnings and earning capacity of $15,000.00 and $1.00 for general damages 
pain and suffering, etc. for a total of $23,588.13. The jury initially returned a 
verdict of zero amount for general damages, but on instructions of the trial court 
went out, reconsidered such issue and returned the sum of $1.00 for such damages. 
(Record p. 187.) (Supplemental Transcript.) 
The plaintiff's motion for new trial was filed on or about March 2, 1982 and 
was duly heard by the trial court judge. (Record p. 190.) Such motion set forth 
five bases for the granting of a new trial, i.e. failure of the court to give 
plaintiff's res ipsa loquitur instructions; the giving by the court of a jury instruc-
tion on unavoidable accident; the refusal of the court to permit plaintiff's counsel 
to cross-examine defendant's witness on the basis of questions and answers to 
written interrogatories submitted under oath by the defendant; passion and preju-
dice indicated by the jury verdict of $23,587 .13 for special damages and only $1.00 
for general damages coupled with a finding of no negligence on the part of the 
defendant and the giving by the court of an instruction that the jury could find in 
favor of the plaintiff for general damages in the sum of $1.00 other nominal 
damages. The court, by order of March 11, 1982, denied plaintiff's Motion. 
(Record pp. 195 and 196.) 
The plaintiff's Notice of Appeal was filed on April 7, 1982. (Record p. 200.) 
-7-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED 
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN REFUSING 
TO GIVE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S 
REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
ON RES IPSA LOQUITUR 
The uncontroverted testimony of the plaintiff and the defendant's only wit-
ness at the trial discloses that all elements necessary to warrant and/or to require 
the court to give requested jury instructions on res ipsa loquitur were present. In 
the case of Edna D. Wightman, v. Mountain Fuel Supply Company, 302 P.2d 471, 
the Utah Supreme Court in 1956 set forth such elements in the following language: 
"In order to invoke this doctrine it is generally recognized that 
the fallowing elements must be present: 
(1) that the accident was of a kind which, in the ordinary 
course of events, would not have happened had due care been 
observed; (2) that it happened irrespective of any participation by 
the plaintiff; and (3) that the cause thereof was something under 
the management or control of the defendant, or for which it is 
responsible." 
As to the first factor, i.e. that the accident was of a kind which in the 
ordinary course of events would not have happened had due care been observed, 
the facts in this case appear to clearly meet this test. The plaintiff had used 
some 250,000 pallets and knew that those of the type supplied by the defendant 
when this accident occurred would safely bear 3,000 to 4,000 pounds of weight. 
Plaintiff's weight with two trees in hand would total 310 pounds. Mr. Hunt 
testified (TR pages 124-125) that pallets of the type Mr. Coupe delivered to 
plaintiff were used to deliver bags of cement weighing 90 pounds each which at 35 
bags per pallet totals 3,150 pounds. Further such type of pallets were delivered to 
the defendant carrying cement blocks numbering 240 at 15 pounds each or 3600 
-8-
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pounds. Pallets of the type used herein carry safely weights far exceeding those 
obtaining when the plaintiff broke through and fell. 
The second factor is that it occurred irrespective of any participation by the 
plaintiff. This is met in the instant case in that the facts show plaintiff did 
nothing more with respect to the pallet in question than to step on it carrying two 
trees for the defendant's store. Plaintiff made no unusual movements or motions 
and he placed no undue stress on the pallet. He did exactly as Mr. Hunt, the 
manager of the garden shop, intended and wanted, i.e. Mr. Kusy took trees from 
the trailer and stepped out on the pallet to load the same. The weight on the 
pallet when fully loaded w·ith trees would only be some 1900 pounds. It should be 
noted that only some eight trees were on the pallet nearest the forklift yet the 
pallet broke in the middle near the trailer when plaintiff stepped on it the third 
time. His person and the trees weighed all of 310 pounds. These weights are far 
less than those the pallets, in the ordinary course of events, would bear in the 
nature of cement bags, cement blocks or shrubs and trees. It should further be 
noted that the jury verdict made no finding of negligence on the part of the 
plaintiff. It must therefore be taken as fact that the plaintiff did nothing to 
cause the accident and it happened irrespective of anything the plaintiff did. 
The third element is also fulfilled in that the pallet, the cause of the 
accident, was under the management or control of the defendant or it was 
responsible for it. The testimony in this context of both Mr. Kusy and Mr. Hunt is 
clear. The pallets were under the care, control, jurisdiction and management of 
the defendant. The pallets were brought to the K-Mart store by other companies 
which then left the pallets at the store lot. Defendant had purchased some of the 
pallets through the delivery process. Mr. Hunt testified that some of the pallets 
were owned; some were kept permanently and others would be held for from two 
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to several weeks. In any event, all were used by defendant over and over again 
during the periods that the pallets were in the care and control of K-Mart. 
The plaintiff testified that when he asked Mr. Coupe to get another pallet 
rather than to use the one that broke, Mr. Coupe refused. Without more this 
clearly shows defendant's sole control of the pallets, i.e. Mr. Kusy could either 
take the pallet that was offered to him or he could have driven away with his 
product. Plaintiff did not take the latter action because the condition of the 
pallet that broke, except for two boards near the forklift, appeared sound and he 
therefore felt safe in stepping on the pallet near the trailer. In any event, 
plaintiff's concern was not that the pallet would break while it was in the air and 
he was on it. Rather it was that the cracked board might break once it had been 
loaded and put down on on the ground. Then when the tines of the forklift were 
pulled out of the pallet, plaintiff thought the weight of the shrubs on the cracked 
board could have caused a break allowing some of the shrubs to fall on the ground 
and be damaged. 
It bears noting here the Wightman case, supra, specifically holds that the 
control of the instrumentality by the defendant need not be exclusive. The court 
quotes Dean Prosser's book on Torts, second edition, page 206 as follows: 
"He makes reference to examples of malfunctioning machinery, 
defective appliances and other situations where the instrumental-
ity has passed beyond the control of the person responsible for its 
condition and is being used by and under the complete control of 
the plaintiff. As suggested by that eminent authority it would 
seem more accurate to appraise the situation in terms of the 
defendant's responsibility for the instrumentality, its condition or 
function, rather than merely its control. Whether it is in the 
defendant's exclusive control or not, if the evidence reasonably 
eliminates other explanations than the defendant's negligence, that 
provides the basis upon which the jury may be permitted to inf er 
that it was defendant's negligence which resulted in the injury." 
(Emphasis added.) 
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The court continued by stating that it was not concerned therefore with the 
degree of control the gas company had over the pipes in the Wightman home. 
Instead, it proceeded upon the assumption that the gas company was responsible 
for that part of the system it put on plaintiff's property leaving the responsibility 
on the Wightman's for the house piping, furnace and gas water heater they or their 
agents had installed. 
The court further said: 
"To give rise to a jury question there must be something in the 
evidence from which the jury could reasonably believe that there 
is a greater probability that the explosion occurred in that part of 
the installation e1a.n in the pipes or appliances installed by and 
under the care of the Wightmans. Only if there is some such 
basis in the evidence vvould there be any foundation to permit the 
jury, under res ipsa loquitur, to Infer that some defect or lack of 
due care in the gas company's part of the installation caused the 
leak and the resulting explosion.'' 
In view of the ·wightman case it is considered clear that the plaintiff here 
esta.blished that he was entitled to have the court instruct on the principle of res 
ipsa loquitur by and through Jury Instructions 9 and 10 or through some other 
proper ones chosen by the court. 
Furthermore, defendant's only witness at trial testified that at no time did 
any of its employees inspect, maintain or repair defective pallets. Mr. Hunt 
stated that K-Mart employees such as Mr. Coupe, as in the case at hand, would 
simply pick up whatever pallet or pallets were available, lift them to trailer doors 
by forklift to be loaded. Nothing more was done to safeguard any truck driver 
concerned. This course was adhered to in the case at hand. The pallet controlled, 
managed and delivered to plaintiff's trailer door by defendant was the responsibil-
ity of the defendant. Plaintiff did not and does not know why it broke without 
warning dropping him to the ground and breaking his wrist. 
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In Wightman, the plaintiffs sought on appeal to reverse a directed verdict 
against them on the basis of res ipsa loquitur. This was rejected by the court only 
because it could not be ascertained whether the pipe that was in the control of 
defendant broke or whether the pipe under the control of the plaintiff broke. For 
this sole reason, it appears, the Utah Supreme Court rejected the use of res ipsa 
loquitur and affirmed the decision of the trial court. It should be noted, however, 
as to control, that the facts of the case at hand are far stronger for the plaintiff 
than in the Wightman case. Here it was the breaking of a single pallet that 
caused injury to the plaintiff. The pallet was managed and controlled by def end-
ant and defendant was responsible for it. The plaintiff did nothing to precipitate 
or cause the accident other than what he was expected to do by the defendant. 
The facts and attendant circumstances of this case when viewed in light of the 
Court's decision in Wightman demonstrate that the trial court herein should have 
granted the plaintiff's request for the issuance of Jury Instructions on the doctrine 
of res ipsa loquitur. Failure of that court to do so is reversible error and the 
matter should be ref erred to the Third Judicial District Court for a new trial. 
The ruling of the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Sanone v, J. C. Penney 
Company, 404 P.2d 248, when applied to the case at bar, discloses further that the 
trial court herein was in error. In Sanone, a little girl got on an escalator with 
her mother. While descending the little girl cried out that her foot was caught. 
The mother pulled the child up instinctively and it was found that the skin and 
muscle of the girl's leg had been severely torn. The plaintiff could not or did not 
know and was unable to show just what caused her injury. The trial court 
submitted the case to the jury on res ipsa loquitur instructions. Appellant asserted 
that this was the principal error on appeal. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court stating that it was common 
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knowledge that escalators are widely used and thousands of people including child-
ren use them daily without injury. It should be noted here that it was well known 
to the plaintiff herein and the defendant that pallets were and are safely used of 
the type concerned bearing loads of up to at least 3600 pounds without breaking. 
The opinion in Sanone states it is certainly not unreasonable for one to assume 
that an escalator is safe to use in the manner and for the purpose for which they 
were intended. The same can surely be said in behalf of the plaintiff herein with 
respect to the pallet furnished to him, which certainly was used in the manner and 
for the purpose intended. The court's opinion stated: 
" ••• Nor does it depart from reason to draw the inference that 
if an escalator is so used and aG injury occurs there was some-
thing wrong in either the construction, maintenance, or operation 
of the escalator. • • . The effect of the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur is to authorize the jury to draw an inference of negli-
gence whete such circumstances exist. Inasmuch as the escalator 
was under the exclusive control of the defendant, the test for the 
application of the doctrine is fulfilled. ••. Once the proper 
foundation for the application of res ipsa loquitur was established, 
that was a sufficient basis for submitting the case to the jury and 
for the finding of a verdict. The fact that in response to special 
interrogatories the jury failed to find any specific negligence will 
not def eat the general verdict. It is plain that if the jury were 
required also to find specific acts of negligence, the doctrine of 
res ipsa loquitur would be nullified and could just as well be 
eliminated from the case." 
It should be noted further that the plaintiff testified that he did not 
know why the pallet broke. (TR p. 107 .) He didn't inspect it to any material 
degree either before or after the accident. (TR pp. 95, 107 and 108.) It is just 
under these conditions that the court in International Creosoting and Construction 
Company v. Daniel, 114 S. W. 2nd 393, held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
applied. The court further observed that the defendant's objection to the court's 
holding that res ipsa loquitur applied was without merit. The court said: 
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"The evidence shows without question that at the time and place 
and under the circumstances alleged, def end ant caused a hoisting 
device, ref erred to in the evidence as a "crane", carrying a 
number of poles, to be moved and carried over the plaintiff and 
that while being so moved and carried the load of poles fell upon 
the plaintiff and injured him. . • . While the naked fact that an 
accident has happened may be no evidence of negligence, yet the 
character of the accident and the circumstances in proof attend-
ing it may be such as to lead reasonably to the belief that, 
without negligence, it would not have occurred, and, as further 
said in the opinion, that, where the accident is such as in the 
ordinary course of things does not happen, if those who have the 
management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in 
the absence of explanation, that the accident arose from one of 
care." 
The trial court's refusal here to give the instructions requested by the 
plaintiff on res ipsa loquitur were seriously damaging to the plaintiff's chances for 
the jury to find negligence on the part of defendant. It is believed that if the jury 
had had before it an instruction on res ipsa loquitur it could well have concluded 
that the accident in question would not have happened had the defendant exercised 
reasonable care in inspecting, repairing, maintaining and utilizing the pallet. Thus 
the failure of the court to give an instruction on res ipsa loquitur in all likelihood 
established a context for the jury where the plaintiff, without an inference of 
negligence to assist him, failed, in the jurors' minds, to prove which specific act of 
negligence on the part of the defendant caused the injury. 
Attention is invited to Ellis V. Henderson, 98 S. E. 2nd 719. There the 
plaintiff was being carried during a parade in the bucket of a tractor loader owned 
by the defendant and driven and operated by one of the defendant's employees. As 
the parade was in progress the bucket suddenly tipped, dropping plaintiff to the 
pavement causing him severe injuries. The record indicated that the person riding 
in the bucket had no control of the mechanism of the bucket and had no way to 
release the mechanism so as to allow the contents of the bucket to fall. Based 
upon these facts, the court found the elements of res ipsa loquitur were present 
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and were properly applied. The court said the accident was of the type which 
would ordinarily not occur in the absence of negligence; the instrumentality which 
caused the accident was under the control of the defendant and the accident was 
not caused by the plaintiff. In summary, the decision states as follows: 
"In an action based upon negligence for the recovery of damages 
there must be reasonable evidence that the defendant was negli-
gent. When, however, the instrumentality which causes an injury 
is shown to be under the management and the control of the 
defendant and the injury is such as in the ordinary course of 
events does not happen if the person having such management and 
control uses proper care, the occurrence of the injury furnishes 
reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the def end-
ant, that it resulted from negligence. . . • This case, in our 
opinion, com es fully within the doctrine of res ipsa loqui tur as set 
forth in Wright v. Valan, supra, and for this reason we are of the 
opinion that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should be applied to 
the case at bar. That being so, it was unnecessary for the 
plaintiff affirmatively to prove negligence. We simply hold that 
the jury had a right to inf er under the holdings of this court • • . 
that the defendants were in fact, guilty of actionable negligence." 
See also Stanford v. Richmond Chase Company, 272 P.2d 764. There the 
plaintiff was injured on defendant's premises while defendant's employees were 
operating forklifts and placing pallets on a trailer driven by plaintiff. The trial 
court gave the plaintiff's requested instructions on res ipsa loquitur and from this 
the defendants, who were found negligent, appealed. The plaintiff was injured 
when he was standing between two trailers in an open space, being suddenly hit 
and knocked out. Plaintiff testified that he did not know who or what hit him or 
how he was struck. On such facts the court said: 
"As a general rule, res ipsa loquitur is applicable where it appears 
that the accident is of such a nature that it can be said, in the 
light of past experience, that it probably was the result of negli-
gence by someone and that the defendant is probably the person 
who is responsible. • • • As aids to help the courts in determin-
ing whether such probabilities exist with regard to a particular 
occurrence, the courts have considered, among other things, the 
extent of control exercised by the defendant and the conduct of 
the plaintiff." 
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The court continued: 
" • • • It is apparent that there are only two possible explanations 
for the cause of plaintiff's injuries: either he was struck by a 
forklift or he fell from some portion of his truck. Plaintiff 
testified that before losing consciousness he did not climb onto 
any part of the truck and that he did not customarily get on 
empty boxes while fastening his load. • • • It can be inferred 
that his loss of memory began as of the moment he was injured, 
and the jury could reasonably conclude from all the evidence that 
the accident was not due to a fall from the truck but, rather, 
that plaintiff was struck and injured by a forklift at the point 
between the two trailers. • • . The requirement of the doctrine 
of res ipsa loquitur that the plaintiff must show that he did not 
contribute to the accident, is satisfied by the evidence that plain-
tiff was standing between the two trailers when he was struck, 
since the jury could properly conclude that a reasonable man, 
under the same circumstances, would expect that the space would 
be a safe one within which to stand. Further, it obviously seems 
more probable than not that a person standing in plaintiff's posi-
tion would not have been struck by a forklift if due care were 
used in its operation, and, therefore, under the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur, it can be inferred that the operator of the forklift 
which struck plaintiff was negligent. In reaching this conclusion 
and in considering the propriety of the res ipsa loqui tur instruc-
tions, we have, of course, disregarded the direct evidence of 
negligence on the part of the forklift operators in backing without 
looking where they were going. " 
In both Stanford, supra, and the case at bar, the facts warrant, nay require, 
an instruction on res ipsa loquitur. In both the plaintiff did not cause the 
accident. In both defendants were operating forklifts and using pallets. In both it 
can be said, in the light of past experience, that the accident would probably not 
have happened except for the negligence of the defendants. Finally, in both the 
defendants exercised control over the instrumentalities which caused injuries to 
the plaintiffs. 
Also pertinent is the decision in Doke v. Pacific Crane and Rigging, 182 P .2d 
284. There the decedent assisted the defendants by tying a sling on the arrester 
for the purpose of lifting materials by crane from decedent's truck. The decedent 
had to tie the arrester four or five times before he got it in balance so that the 
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load could be raised. After it was off the ground and had been moved some 
twenty or thirty feet and while the decedent was climbing up a ladder to the top 
of an incinerator, the load suddenly dropped and fell with a loud noise on top of 
the incinerator. The decedent, who was near the top of the ladder, fell to the 
ground and was killed. 
The trial court in Doke, supra, issued a judgment of nonsuit against the 
plaintiff. The plaintiff appealed asserting that the evidence properly presented a 
case of res ipsa loquitur to the court and the court should have so instructed the 
jury. In Doke the decision sets out the same three factors for use of res ipsa 
loquitur that were established by the Utah Supreme Court in Wightman, supra. 
The court in Doke, supra, said that the reason for the application of res ipsa 
loquitur and the very hypothesis of the doctrine is that ordinarily the one injured 
is not in a position to know more than that, by some unusual movement of the 
instrumentality, he was injured, whereas the one who operates the instrumentality 
should know what happened or be liable for a defect in the same. The court found 
that instructions on res ipsa loquitur should have been given and the judgment of 
nonsuit was reversed. It did so in the fallowing language: 
"The evidence is sufficient to create an inference of negligence 
on the part of defendant, and plaintiff should not be deprived of 
the benefit of the doctrine merely because some agency over 
which defendant had no control could have caused the accident." 
In citing Lejeune v. General Petroleum Corp., 18 P .2d 429, case the Doke 
opinion addresses the defendant's contention-that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
did not apply as the accident was due to the intervention of agencies over which it 
had no control. 
The court in Lejeune, supra, said: 
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" • • . It has been held in several cases involving the doctrine in 
question that the inference of negligence may arise regardless of 
the fact that the injury might have been caused by some other 
agency· and that where the explanation leaves it doubtful as to 
whethe'r the ulti~ate cause of the injury was the negligence of 
the defendant, the question is one to be determined by the jury 
from all the evidence in the case." 
The Doke decision also states as follows: 
"Thus, the test has become one of right of control rather than 
actual control." 
Noteworthy also is Fink v. New York Cent. R. Company, 56 N.E.2d 931 
where the court made the following comments: 
"While the doctrine does not require that negligence must be 
inf erred from the mere occurrence of an accident, if the accident 
and the circumstances under which it took place give ground for a 
reasonable inference that if due care had been exercised the thing 
that happened amiss would not have happened, the law says res 
ipsa loquitur. . • • The plaintiff is entitled to any inferences 
favorable to him which may be drawn from the evidence of the 
defendant as well as from his own evidence. If such inferences 
are present they gain added weight if they arise from evidence 
introduced by the defendant. • • • It will be noted in these 
excerpts from the charge (and all pertinent sections from the 
charge have been quoted) that the court repeatedly placed the 
burden on the plaintiff to prove negligence, ref raining from any 
statement indicating that the plaintiff was entitled by reason of 
the rule of res i9sa loqui tur to an inference of negligence from 
the derailment alone. By reason of the language quoted the jury 
must have been impressed with such repeated statements of the 
duty of the plaintiff and been influenced thereby in reaching a 
conclusion that the evidence of the defendants was conclusive 
against the plaintiff. • . • Should not a proper charge to the jury 
then contain a statement that the plaintiff was still clothed with 
a rebut table inference calling for an explanation by the defendant 
showing to the satisfaction of the jury that what occurred still 
was consistent with the exercise of the proper care by the de-
f endant? ••• " 
In Bedford v. Re, 510 P.2d 724, the plaintiff sought an instruction on res ipsa 
loquitur; the trial court denied this request and the defendant on appeal contended 
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that such rejection was proper. This was so, the defendant stated, because the 
plaintiff had testified in detail as to what the defendant's acts had been and had 
also shown the actual cause of the harm. The court said we have long held that 
ordinarily introduction of evidence of specific acts of negligence does not deprive 
a plaintiff of the doctrine of res ipsa loqui tur. The decision states: 
"The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable where the accident 
is of such a nature that it can be said, in the light of past 
experience, that it probably was the result of negligence by some-
one and that the defendant is probably the one responsible. • •• 
It is based upon a common sense inference of the happening of 
the accident. • • • To establish that the defendant is probably 
responsible, it is not necessary that the instrumentality which 
caused the accident was under the exclusive control of the de-
fendant. The requirement of control is not an absolute one. • • • 
The plaintiff need not exclude all other persons who might possib-
ly have been responsible where the defendant's negligence appears 
to be the more probable explanation of the accident. • • . Thus 
in cases where the defendant has relinquished control of the 
instrumentality we have held that the plaintiff may raise the 
inference that it was defective when it left defendant's possession 
by demonstrating that it has not· been improperly handled or its 
condition otherwise changed since leaving the defendant's control." 
Note also Krohmer v. Dahl, 402 P.2d 979; Kitto v. Gilbert, 570 P.2d 544 and 
Jackson v. H. H. Robertson Co., Inc., 574 P.2d 882. The latter case is of value 
with respect to the case at issue because of that court's careful explanation of 
what exclusive control means. The Jackson court ruled as follows: 
"The exclusive control requirement in a res ipsa loquitur case is 
really circumstantial evidence supporting the inference that the 
defendant probably is responsible for the harm to the plaintiff, for 
the significant time of exclusive control is the time at which the 
alleged negligence resulting in the injury occurred not the time of 
the accident. • . • Thus, it is irrelevant that the employees of 
one or both defendants may have been at lunch at the time of the 
accident. Employees of both defendants had control of the injur-
ious instrumentality at times close enough to the accident to 
permit the inference that the negligence of one or both def end-
ants caused the harm to Jackson." 
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To like effect is Deakin v. Putt, 596 P.2d 671, which held that the plaintiff 
was entitled to have the jury instructed as to res ipsa loquitur. That court noted 
that such doctrine had been applied where a restaurant stool broke and where a 
restaurant chair collapsed. 
In Chahiuiou v. McCormick, 381 P .2d 377, the court said the test of preju-
dice is where it could not be said as matter of law, that had the instruction been 
given, verdict would have been for defendants. It would appear this test applied 
to the case herein indicates the court's refusal to give res ipsa loquitur instruc-
tions is error and the error is prejudicial to Mr. Kusy. 
See Transcontinental Bus System, Inc. v. Symmons, 367 P .2d 160 where the 
plaintiff alleged and sought to prove specific acts of negligence. The trial judge 
issued a directed verdict against the plaintiff and thereafter upon plaint if f's 
Motion raising the issue of res ipsa loquitur, granted a new trial. From this the 
defendants appealed. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that despite the 
introduction of evidence of actual negligence by the plaintiff, he was further 
entitled to rely upon and to have given to the jury for consideration instructions 
on res ipsa loquitur. The defendants asserted that either the defendants were 
negligent in failing to properly latch the door as alleged when it was open for 
which the defendants would have been liable, or the door fell because of a latent 
defect of which defect the defendants had no knowledge and for which they would 
not be liable. The defendants contend that if there are at least two probable 
causes, either of which may have been the efficient cause, and there is no 
evidence tending to show which of the two probably caused the accident, you then 
have a mere choice of probabilities which amounts to but conjecture and surmise 
and under such circumstances use of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is improper. 
The trial court disagreed and granted the Motion for a new trial. The appellate 
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decision stated: 
"Where the instrumentality or thing which causes injury is shown 
to be under the management and control of the defendant, and 
the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not 
happen if those who have the management use proper care, it 
affords reasonable evidence in the absence of explanation by the 
defendant, that the accident arose from want of care. . • • The 
fact that an injury results from a latent defect in a device that 
caused the injury does not prevent a plaintiff from relying on the 
doctrine of res ipsa loqui tur. . . . Where an accident causing 
injuries to a passenger occurs through the breaking, or the defect-
ive condition of some portion, of the machinery or appliances by 
which the passenger is carried, a prim a f acie case of negligence 
on the part of the carrier is made out. It is then incumbent on 
the carrier, in order to prevent a recovery, to show that the 
injury occurred without any negligence on his part, and that it 
was the result of an inevitable accident. The passenger does not 
have the burden of proving latent defects in appliances and de-
fendant's knowledge thereof. . • • Upon plaintiff showing that 
the bus was under the control of defendants; that the accident 
was such as in the ordinary course of events does not occur, she, 
under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, made a prima facie case 
and the burden was cast upon defendants to show that they 
exercised the utmost care for plaintiff's safety." 
Taking into account the circumstances of our case, it is deemed apparent 
that the pallet that broke, dropping Mr. Kusy to the ground, was under the 
management or control of the defendant and that the defendant had the responsi-
bility, the authority and the right to select which pallet was to be used and to 
bring that pallet to plaintiff for unloading purposes. Furthermore, pallets of the 
same type as the one used herein, safely carry weights of from 3,000 to 4,000 
pounds. Defendant's own witness, Mr. Hunt, stated that such pallets brought to 
the store loads in excess of 3,000 up to 3,6000 pounds. It appears clear, therefore, 
that the breaking of the pallet and the dropping of the plaintiff to the ground was 
an event that ordinarily would not have happened had the defendant used due care 
to inspect, maintain, repair or replace pallets such as was used herein. Finally, 
plaintiff's participation in the unloading did not cause his injury. In any event, 
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plaintiff should have had this issue of res ipsa loquitur decided by the jury on the 
basis of proper instructions. 
On the basis of the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted to this court that 
the trial court erred in refusing to grant the plaintiff's proposed instructions 9 and 
10 as to res ipsa loquitur. This refusal of the trial court was injurious to the 
plaintiff's case inasmuch as the jury ultimately returned a decision of no negli-
gence on the part of the defendant. With instructions on res ipsa loquitur it would 
have been possible, if not likely, under the attendant circumstances and facts for 
the jury to have concluded that the pallet was managed and controlled by the 
defendant; that it would not normally have broken without negligence on the part 
of the defendant; that the plaintiff's conduct did not cause the pallet to break and 
ultimately to find for the plaintiff and against the defendant on the basis of 
negligence. 
POINT II 
THE COURT COMMITTED REVERS-
IBLE ERROR IN GIVING THE 
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT'S 
REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTION 
ON UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT. 
The trial court adopted and gave to the jury the defendant's proposed 
instruction on unavoidable accident. The plaintiff took due exception to the giving 
of this instruction. (TR p. 159.) Under the circumstances of the case involved, 
such an instruction is believed to be reversible error and on such basis the case 
should be remanded to the Third Judicial District Court for a new trial. 
It seems clear that an instruction on unavoidable accident is not properly for 
use where the defendant is shown by testimony or legitimate inference to have 
been negligent. It appears to be a contradiction in terms to have negligence 
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shown and yet to have a trial court give an instruction on unavoidable accident. 
The sine qua non of negligence is that it is avoidable with due care. 
In the case at issue there is direct evidence that the plaintiff was negligent 
in its care, use and control of pallets it possessed. Note the following testimony 
of Mr. Hunt: 
TR p. 123. 
Q: Did you have wooden pallets around out there at the garden 
shop? Now, we are talking about May of '76. 
A: Yes sir. We did. 
Q: Where did these pallets come from? 
A: From various firms. 
TR p. 146. 
Q: At any rate the pallets that are left there are in the 
possession of K-Mart. Are they not? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And you use those pallets? 
A: Yes. We do. 
Q: You use them continuously over and over again. Isn't that 
correct. 
A: Yes we do. 
Q: And they are used in similar tasks to those involved in this 
case, to unload products from trailers? 
A: Yes. 
TR p. 147 
Q: 
A: 
And they are used where forklifts raise a pallet and put it 
up to the height of a trailer and material of one sort or 
another is taken from the trailer onto the pallet. Isn't that 
correct? 
That is our procedure. Yes. 
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Q: And this is not uncommon for the truck driver who is un-
loading from the trailer to the pallet, for him to step out on 
the pallet. Isn't that correct? 
A: You say that is not uncommon. 
Q: It's not uncommon for that to happen. Is it? 
A: No. It's not uncommon. 
Q: Do you have any procedure for inspecting these pallets you 
furnish to these drivers? 
A: What do you mean procedure? 
Q: Do you inspect the pallets before? 
A: Do I inspect the pallets? 
Q: Yes. 
A: No. I don't. 
Q: Does anyone from K-Mart inspect them? 
A: Not to my knowledge. No. 
Q: Does anyone from K-Mart repair broken boards? 
A: Not to my knowledge, no. 
Q: Do you perform any maintenance on these pallets? 
A: As a rule, no, we don't. 
Q: The pallet that broke when Mr. Kusy stepped on it, you're 
saying, then, was never inspected, so far as you know, by 
yourself 
TR p. 148 
or Mr. Coupe or anyone else? 
A: Not to my knowledge, no. 
Q: Nor was it repaired or otherwise maintained? 
A: It was not repaired. 
Q: Yet, that pallet was in your possession and control, was it 
not? 
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A: It was in our possession. 
Q: It was in your control? You were using it. Is that correct? 
A: We were using the pallet. 
Q: When you instructed Mr. Coupe in this particular instance, 
did you tell him to inspect the pallets before they were 
furnished to Mr. Kusy at the doorway so he could load 
them? 
A: Inspect them in what way? 
Q: To make sure they were sound and safe for Mr. Kusy to step 
on? 
A: No, I didn't instruct him as to any-I did not give Mr. Kusy 
any instructions as to inspecting the pallets, no. 
Q: Did you tell him to make sure that he got good ones that 
would be safe to step upon? 
A: No, I didn't give Mr. Coupe any instructions to that order. 
Q: You simply told him to get a forklift and put pallets up to 
the level of the trailer and that was about all. Isn't that 
correct? 
TR p. 148 
A: That's about it, sir. 
Q: And the condition of those pallets was not really a concern 
to you at that time. Is that correct? 
A: At that time, no. 
Attention is invited to the case of Woodhouse v. Johnson, 436 P.2d 442, 
decided in this court January 18, 1968. There the trial court gave an instruction 
on unavoidable accident. The plaintiff appealed asserting that the giving of an 
instruction on unavoidable accident was reversible error. The court pointed out in 
its Instruction No. 18 that the law recognizes unavoidable accidents, which it 
defined as one which occurs in such a manner that it cannot justly be said to have 
been caused by negligence. The court further noted that such an insb .. uction 
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should be given with caution and only where the evidence would justify it. Never-
theless, the opinion stated that it could not declare categorically that there is no 
such thing as an unavoidable accident and that the instruction should never be 
given. The court said it is obvious that there are some accidents, i.e. unusual and 
unexpected occurrences, which result in injury and which happen without anyone 
failing to exercise reasonable care. When this is so the accident is properly 
classified as unavoidable in so far as legal causation for the imposition of liability 
is concerned. 
The court also noted that in most negligence cases an instruction on unavoid-
able accident would be improper. It also pointed out that the basic reason given 
for criticizing such an instruction is that it is a duplication because elsewhere the 
jury is advised that the defendant's negligence must be proved and that in the 
absence of such negligence he is not liable. In brief, the court found in Woodhouse 
that the defendant had in fact used all reasonable care and that there was nothing 
further in the exercise of such care that she could have done to have avoided the 
accident and thus from her point of view the accident was unavoidable. 
Perhaps more noteworthy are the views pronounced by the court's dissenters. 
They point out that an unavoidable accident means an unexpected catastrophe 
occurring without any of the parties thereto being to blame ior it. They also said 
that where one or both of the drivers of colliding cars were guilty of negligence it 
would be error to give an instruction on unavoidable accident to the jury. The 
minority view stated that if the evidence raises an issue that the negligence of 
one of the parties caused the injury then an issue of unavoidable accident is not 
raised either. Also cited was 65 ALR 2d p. 30 stating that under the law of 
Alabama, "the rule is now settled to the effect that because of the tendency to 
confuse and mislead the better practice is to refuse such charge (unavoidable 
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accident). It was further noted that many states have overruled their prior 
holdings and now refuse to permit the instruction under any circumstances. 
The Woodhouse case probably states the current rule in Utah on the matter 
of giving an instruction on unavoidable accident. It is clear, however, from 
reading the facts that Woodhouse does not support the giving of an instruction on 
unavoidable accident in the Kusy case. In the first place, Woodhouse is a case 
where the defendant used all reasonable steps feasible to her to prevent the 
accident that occurred. In the case at hand, it is apparent that the defendant did 
not take any, let alone all, reasonable steps necessary to prevent harm to Mr. 
Kusy. In fact, defendant, in a cavalier manner, delivered to the plaintiff pallets 
that had never been inspected, repaired or maintained even though it was admitted 
by Mr. Hunt that occasionally trucks ran over the pallets. Mr. Hunt indeed had no 
concern at all for the pallets vis a vis Mr. Kusy. It is submitted that this court 
need not overrule Woodhouse to find the trial court committed reversible error as 
to its unavoidable accident instruction in the case at hand. The facts of the two 
cases are just too disparate. However, it is believed that Woodhouse ought to be 
overruled simply because instructions on negligence and preponderance of evidence 
are a sufficient hurdle for plaintiffs to face let alone to saddle them with a 
duplicated instruction on unavoidable accident. 
Here the instruction placed an undue and improper burden on the plaintiff to 
prove negligence on the part of the defendant, either directly or through res ipsa 
loquitur. The plaintiff was severely injured. The jury verdict found substantial 
special damages and yet determined there was no negligence on the part of the 
defendant. It seems possible if not probable that the jury was improperly steered 
to such a finding by reason of such instruction. Defendant's apparent negligence 
leads to such a conclusion. 
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Note also Robinson v. State Stove and Manufacturing Company, Inc., 518 
P.2d 902 and Lewis v. Buckskin Joe's, Inc., 396 P.2d 933. In the latter case the 
Colorado Supreme Court reversed as error a trial court's giving of an instruction 
on unavoidable accident. The court said: 
"This instruction should not have been given. Instructions on 
negligence and contributory negligence are sufficient and inclusive 
of so-called unavoidable accidents. To further instruct on una-
voidable accident serves only to twice tell the jury that the 
plaintiff cannot recover unless he proves negligence. Though this 
court has sanctioned the giving of instructions on unavoidable 
accident and, on occasion, held it to be reversible error to refuse 
to so instruct, we now determine that to give such instruction or 
to recognize as unavoidable accident in an action based on negli-
gence, as an independent element, separate and apart from negli-
gence and contributory negligence is improper." 
See also Fenton v. Aleshire, 393 P.2d 217; Vespe v. DiMarco, 204 A.2d 874; 
City of Phoenix v. Camfield, 400 P.2d 115 and Butigan v. Yellow Cab, 320 P.2d 
500. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Wellman v. Noble, 366 P.2d 701, stated that it 
had held in cases where the facts warranted it that it was not error to give an 
instruction on unavoidable accident. The court further said, however, that actually 
such an instruction in most cases is superfluous in view of other instructions which 
are given covering the basic iss1:1es in accident cases and serves no useful purpose 
except to add to the length of the instructions and to that extent detract from 
their effectiveness. We know of no case the court said where this court has ever 
held a failure to given an instruction on unavoidable accident to be prejudicial 
error. It is submitted here, however, that where negligence is proven or inf erred 
it is error to give such an instruction because it tends to overemphasize the 
plaintiff's duty. Thus giving of such an instruction in the face of negligence shown 
is reversible error. 
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Where negligence is shown or inf erred as here, it cannot help but be prejudi-
cial to the plaintiff to have an unavoidable accident instruction given. The 
plaintiff therefore merits a new trial on the basis or' the giving of such instruction 
particularly when the jury found as it did here that the plaintiff was not contribu-
torily negligent. Curby v. Ulysses Irrigation Pipe Company, 464 P .2d 245. 
On the basis of direct evidence of negligence or evidence properly inf erred, 
it is respectfully urged that this court find the issuance of an instruction on 
unavoidable accident reversible error and the case remanded for a new trial. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR ON REFUSING TO PERMIT COUNSEL 
FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT TO CROSS-
EXAMINE THE DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT'S 
WITNESS AS TO WRITTEN INTERROGATORY 
ANSWERS FURNISHED BY THE DEFENDANT 
K-MART APPAREL FASHIONS CORP. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 33 (a) provides for the serving of written 
interrogatories upon a party, including a corporation, and the answering thereof 
under oath. Rule 33 (b) provides for the use at trial of written interrogatories and 
their answers to the extent permitted by the rules of evidence. 
Defendant's only witness at the trial was a Mr. Hunt, the manager of the 
garden shop of the \1urray K-Mart store. In part he testified as follows: (TR p. 
142.) 
Q: What was your conversation with Mr. Coupe when you walk-
ed over to see what was going on? 
A: I believe I asked him just that, what was going on. And he 
told me that Mr. Kusy had fallen off the pallet and injured 
himself. (Emphasis added.) 
Q: Did he say anything about what the nature of the injury 
was? 
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A: He didn't say other than the fact that he had fallen off the 
pallet and injured himself. (Emphasis added.) 
TR p. 143. 
Q: While you were over there near the forklift and before you 
went back to assist with the other chores you had out there, 
did you observe any broken boards on the ground near where 
Mr. Kusy was getting up? 
A: Not that I recall, no. 
Inasmuch as the foregoing testimony was at variance with answers under oath 
given to written interrogatories by the defendant, counsel for plaintiff moved the 
court for introduction into evidence of the defendant's answers to plaintiff's 
interrogatories, which are contained in the file. (TR p. 152.) 
The Court: Well, now, they don't go into evidence. 
Mr. Fairclough: All right, your honor. 
The Court: We use them in the same manner as a deposition if 
the witness is present. 
TR p. 154. 
Q: Interrogatories were asked of the defendant by the plaintiff 
and they were answered by the defendant on October 28th, 
1980. And they were signed and notarized under oath. The 
answers were given by Michael Street. Who is Michael 
Street? 
A: He is the manager, the general manager at K-Mart 4150. 
Q: Was he the general manager at the time of the accident? 
A: No, he was not •.. 
• • • • • 
Q: Did you discuss with Mr. Street the facts pertaining to this 
accident before he answered these interrogatories? 
A: It's possible, yes. 
Q: Did you tell Mr. Street what happened? 
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A: To some degree, yes, what the case was about, yes. 
• • • • • 
Q: Did you tell your counsel, Mr. Larson in this case, that the 
pallet broke that Mr. Kusy was on? 
A: I don't recall telling him that, no. 
Q: Let me read to you from an interrogatory question. 
The Court: Just a moment. Let me see counsel in 
TR p. 155. 
chambers. Court will be in informal recess. Please 
remain seated. 
(Whereupon, there was an off-the-record discussion held in cham-
bers.) 
• • • • • 
Q: Did you tell Mr. Street that the pallet board broke and the 
plaintiff fell to the ground? 
A: I don't recall if I told him that or not. 
Q: Is it possible you could have told-
A: It's possible I could have told him. 
• • • • • 
TR p. 156.) 
Q: Do you know whether or not the pallet broke? 
A: I do not know that, no. 
Q: It could have broke? 
A: It could have, yes. 
The off-the-record conference between counsel and the court in chambers 
ref erred to (TR pp. 154, 155) consisted of counsel for plaintiff moving the court 
for permission to read the answer to written interrogatories signed by Mr. Street 
under oath where he stated as follows: 
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9. State the facts· of the defendant's own version and account 
for how the casualty occurred. 
A: Plaintiff was assisting in unloading large shrubs called tams 
from the semi truck he had driven for delivery of said tams. 
Plaintiff lifted the tams from the bed of the semi onto a 
pallet that was elevated by a forklift level to the side d~or 
of the semi. After a pallet was fully loaded by the plain-
tiff, either Mr. Coupe or Mr. Hunt would drive the loaded 
forklift from the side of the semi, lower the pallet, and 
remove it. Another pallet was attached to the forklift and 
the forklift was driven back to the side door of the semi. 
This process repeated. As plaintiff was finishing loading 
approximately the next-to-last of two pallet loads, he step-
ped forward with his right foot onto the edge of the pallet. 
For reasons unknown to defendant, the pallet board were he 
stepped broke off and plaintiff fell to the ground." (Empha-
sis added.) 
The court, after said conference, ruled that plaint if f's counsel in cross-
examination could not read to Mr. Hunt the foregoing question and answer. When 
the Judge and counsel returned to the courtroom, counsel for plaintiff asked the 
court for permission to take exception the court's ruling for the record. This was 
done. (Supplemental Transcript.) 
Under the Utah rules of civil procedure, it is provided that answers to 
written interrogatories may be used at trial to the extent permitted by the rules 
of evidence. Under such rules it seems clear that plaintiff's counsel sought to use 
the answer to Interrogatory No. 9 in the same manner as depositions are used at 
trial, i.e. for the purpose of impeaching a witness or as an admission against 
interest. Therefore, when a party seeks to use the answers of the adverse party 
for impeachment or admission purposes, he should be permitted to read such 
answers in the cross-examination. 
Refusal to permit such cross-examination here of Mr. Hunt is considered 
prejudicial error. Clearly, the point in the issue is vital to the plaintiff, i.e. did 
the plaintiff fall through the pallet or not. The court's refusal, therefore, is a 
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proper basis for reversal and remand to the District Court for a new trial. 
The foregoing assertion appears well taken in light of Hill v. Grand Central, 
Inc., 25 Utah 2d. 121, 447 P.2d 150. There the plaintiff submitted written 
interrogatories to the defendant corporation and written answers under oath were 
furnished. The court, on motion for summary judgment, used the answers to 
establish facts supporting its decision. The Supreme Court of Utah reversed this 
ruling and reinstated the case but as to the use of answers to written interrogator-
ies the Court said: 
"In any case where answers to interrogatories are to be used to 
establish a fact, they can only be used as admission against the 
party making them. They are objectionable when offered by the 
party making them because they are self-serving and not subject 
to cross-examination." 
In Barrett v. Melton, 545 P .2d 421, the Arizona trial court accepted. into 
evidence the defendants' joint answers to plaintiff's written interrogatories. The 
court found for the plaintiff in a quiet title action and the defendant appealed 
citing as one basis for reversal the fact that the plaintiff's introduction into 
evidence of their own e.nswers was self-serving hearsay. The court found this was 
true, at least as to the husband who had died prior to trial. Its opinion stated the 
general rule as to the admissibility of answers to interrogatories as follows: 
"Rule 33 (b) Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that 
answers to interrogatories may be used nto the extent permitted 
by the rules of evidence." Such answers when prof erred by the 
answering party as substantive evidence are hearsay and inadmis-
sible. When offered by the opposing party, interrogatories fall 
within the admissions of a party exception to the hearsay rule and 
d . .bl " are a m1ss1 e. . •• 
See also Bogard G.M.C. Co. v. Henley, 374 P.2d 660. There the Supreme 
Court of Arizona held that it was reversible error for a trial court to refuse to 
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permit the defendant company to introduce inconsistent statements from the 
plaintiff's deposition and interrogatories into evidence at the trial. The trial court 
held that the interrogatories could be used for impeachment purposes but not 
necessarily to just read to the jury except in the absence of the person who 
answered the interrogatories. Because the plaintiff was in court, the trial court 
refused defendant's request to use the interrogatories to read questions and ans-
wers and thus impeach the plaintiff. The court reversed the judgment and 
remanded the case for a new trial. 
The court in Mayhood v. LaRosa, 37 4 P .2d 805 held as fallows: 
"Thus, insofar as plaintiff's deposition and answers to interrogator-
ies contained admissions, they should have been admitted into 
evidence. . • • As stated in the two cited cases, an adverse 
party's deposition "may be used to establish any material fact, a 
prim a f acie case, or even to prove the whole case." Consequent-
ly, a party is not limited to using an adverse party's deposition or 
answers to interrogatories for the purpose of impeaching his testi-
mony." 
The foregoing case, decided on the basis of rules of civil procedure similar to 
our own, appears persuasive for the view that the trial court in the case at hand 
should have permitted the reading of defendant's written interrogatory answers as 
first requested by plaintiff's counsel and, in any event, should have permitted use 
of same for impeachment purposes. Failure to so do constitutes reversible error. 
Finally, the New Mexico Court of Appeals ruled similarly in Crabtree v. 
Measday, 508 P .2d 1317. There, in an automobile negligence case, the appellate 
court said: 
"When Rules 26 (d), 33 and 43, supra, are analyzed, logic and 
justice dictate the answers to written interrogatories may be used 
by a party against the party who made the answers, or admissions 
in those answers may be used against the party answering. The 
answers cannot be used by the party making them to establish an 
affirmative claim or defense because they are not subject to 
cross-examination." 
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It is respectfully urged that this court find that the trial court committed 
reversible error and that a remand for a new trial be ordered. It appears clear 
that the trial court's refusal to permit reading to ·the jury of the question and 
answer to Interrogatory No. 9 given by the defendant on the crucial issue of 
whether the pallet broke or not was probably injurious to the plaintiff and his 
case. It is even more apparent, it would seem, that refusal to permit such reading 
and use in cross-examination of defendant's only witness at the trial is prejudicial 
error. 
POINT IV 
THE JURY SPECIAL VERDICT AND THE 
TRIAL COURT'S REQUEST FOR THE JURY 
TO RECONSIDER ITS VERDICT AS TO THE 
AWARD FOR GENERAL DAMAGES INDICATES 
PASSION AND PREJUDICE AGAINST THE 
PLAINTIFF AND BASED THEREON PLAINTIFF 
IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 59, dealing with new trials and amend-
ments of judgment reads as follows: 
"(a) Grounds. Subject to the prov1s1ons of Rule 61 (harmless 
error) a new trial may be granted to all or any of the 
parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the 
following causes: 
(5) excessive or inadequate damages appearing to have 
been given under the influence of passion or prejudice." 
Rule 4 7 (r) reads as follows: 
"Correction of Verdict. If the verdict rendered is informal or 
insufficient, it may be corrected by the jury under the advice of 
the court, or the jury may be sent out again." 
The plaintiff contends that the trial court should have granted his motion for 
a new trial because the jury's finding of no negligence on the part of the 
defendant in the context of the facts of the case and the jury's special verdict is 
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demonstrative of passion and prejudice against the plaintiff. 
Attention is invited to the facts surrounding the special verdict. The jury 
was asked to decide what amount of money would fairly and adequately compen-
sate the plaintiff for any and all loss he had sustained as a result of the accident. 
By stipulation of the parties the medical expense was fixed at $1,088.13. The jury 
found as to lost earnings to trial date, $7 ,500.00; as to lost future earnings and 
earning capacity, $15,000.00, and general damages (pain and suffering, etc.) zero 
dollars. The jury then found as to negligence that the defendant was not negligent 
as claimed by the plaintiff and that the plaintiff was not negligent as claimed by 
the defendant. As to percentages of negligence attributed to the parties, the jury 
found zero for both. 
Plaintiff asserts that it is apparent from the jury verdict that passion and 
prejudice against the plaintiff is shown. First, the jury found $22,500.00 would be 
given to the plaintiff for lost earnings both up to and after the trial. This had to 
be on the basis that the jurors found, indeed, as plaintiff claimed, that his injuries 
were severe and continuing. Yet, in the face of such a finding, which is well 
supported by the evidence, and despite the obvious, concomrnitant fact that such 
injuries would cause considerable pain and suffering, the jury found zero dollars for 
such harm. 
The court at the trial apparently recognized this apparent discrepancy and 
sent the jury back to reconsider its finding as to general damages. The jury then 
returned and granted to the plaintiff $1.00 for pain and suffering. 
The crux of this issue and the plaintiff's claims with respect to same are 
that the passion and prejudice evidenced by the zero dollars (and then after 
prodding a $1.00 award for pain and suffering) led to the jury's finding of no 
negligence on the part of the defendant. 
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It seems clear from the testimony of Mr. Hunt relative to the defendant's 
pallets that defendant was negligent in its furnishing of a defective pallet to Mr. 
Kusy. The danger of such a pallet was obvious when used for unloading purposes 
at a heighth of five feet off the gr0und. Nevertheless, the defendant at no time 
inspected, repaired, or did anything to maintain the pallets to keep them safe. 
The preponderance of the evidence shows that the pallet furnished to Mr. Kusy 
was defective and it broke under a weight of 310 pounds when he stepped on it a 
third time causing him to drop to the ground. 
In the face of this, the jury verdict of no negligence on the part of 
defendant shows passion and prejudice against the plaintiff. This is further made 
manifest because the jury found substantial funds would be needed to compensate 
the plaintiff for lost earnings due to an obvious serious injury yet plaintiff, had 
negligence been found, would have received only one dollar for pain and suffering. 
Such pain and suffering damages are incongruous and unreasonable and clearly 
show a vindictive attitude against the plaintiff. This in turn, it is believed, led to 
the jury's finding of no negligence against the defendant. Passion and prejudice 
clearly form the grounds for a new trial. 
See 25 CJS Damages 196 where the general rule is stated that a damage 
verdict will not be disturbed unless so excessive or inadequate as to indicate 
prejudice, passion, partiality or corruption on the part of the jury. It is also noted 
that an award of damages must represent a reasonable response to the evidence as 
compensation to the injured party. Finally, where, in the light of evidence, the 
amount concerned is so small and at variance with the facts that it is evident the 
jury did not reach a just conclusion, the courts have extended relief by increasing 
the verdict or granting a new trial. 
It is reiterated that the plaintiff views the jury verdict as evidence of 
-37-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
passion and prejudice against him. These feelings thus taint the finding of no 
negligence on the part of the defendant. This result flies in the face of evidence 
the defendant was negligent. 
SUMMARY 
Plaintiff believes that he has presented to this court four bases upon which 
he should be given a new trial. First, plaintiff requested the trial court to give 
instructions on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The defendant had management 
and control of a pallet and the responsibility thereof. In the ordinary course of 
events, the pallet would not break under 310 pounds pressure except for def end-
ant's negligence and the plaintiff did nothing to cause the mishap. All elements 
for res ipsa loquitur are thus met. The lack of such instructions could well be the 
reason the jury found no negligence on the part of the defendant. With such 
instructions the jury could easily have found otherwise, particularly when the 
verdict made a specific finding of no contributory negligence on the part of the 
plaintiff. 
Second, the trial court's giving of defendant's requested jury instruction on 
unavoidable accident was improper. The trend of current decisions is to abolish 
such instructions and this Utah should do. In any event, this case differs from 
those Utah cases where such instruction has been upheld. Here negligence of the 
defendant is shown directly or should be inf erred. When so viewed, the court's 
instruction placed an unfair and improper additional obstacle in plaintiff's efforts 
to prove negligence. It may very well have provided a convenient generality the 
jury could grasp instead of dealing with specific evidence of negligence or that 
which should have been inf erred on the part of the defendant. 
Third, the trial court committed prejudicial and reversible error in refusing 
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to allow plaintiff's counsel to cross-examine Mr. Hunt using defendant's answer to 
written interrogatories both for admission and impeachment purposes. Mr. Hunt 
testified contrary to answer No. 9 and plaintiff was prejudiced when the trial 
court refused to permit the question and answer to be read or even for plaintiff's 
counsel to cross-examine using the answer. Clearly, the question of whether the 
pallet broke or not could have been crucial in the jury's mind. 
Lastly, the plaintiff asserts that the jury's verdict on special damages vis a 
vis pain and suffering is contrary to the evidence and is unreasonable. This 
evidences passion and prejudice against the plaintiff which therefore taints the 
finding of no negligence on the part of defendant. This is particularly true when 
uncontroverted evidence of such negligence was shown in Mr. Hunt's testimony. 
Plaintiff respectfully urges this Honorable Court to remedy the trial court's 
prejudicial errors in granting to the plaintiff a new trial. 
Dated this 22nd day of September, 1982. 
BEESLEY, SPENCER & FAIRCLOUGH 
e,~ 7~~~ 
k Fairclough 
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